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Abstract. In this paper we studied the DVB-RCS (Return 
Channel through Satellite) standard from a privacy per-
spective and proposed an approach to incorporate a loca-
tion privacy enhancing mechanism into the standard. 
Offering location based privacy in DVB-RCS communica-
tion is a challenge as the location of a satellite terminal 
must be revealed to the network operator of the DVB-RCS 
network for technical and administrative reasons. We pro-
posed an approach of cloaking the location by intention-
ally compromising its accuracy whilst maintaining the 
operability and integrity of the communications system. In 
addition we implemented a proof of concept technique 
utilizing the theoretical findings of this work on a real 
DVB-RCS system, presenting the methodology along with 
the tools used and the experimental results. 
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1. Introduction 
The Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) Project was 
founded in 1993 by the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI) with the goal of standardizing 
digital television services [6]. This initial standard for sat-
ellite delivery of digital television was named DVB-S 
(Digital Video Broadcasting-Satellite) [7]. 
The DVB-S infrastructure used to carry television 
services via (Geosynchronous) satellite can be used to 
provide Internet services to subscribers. Internet over sat-
ellite is a competitive technology to DSL technology, hav-
ing the advantage of serving even the most remote areas. 
DVB-S provides only the downlink. A reverse communi-
cations channel is also needed to enable interactivity in 
applications such as web browsing. Symmetric uplink and 
downlink is not a necessity, because most Internet services 
require a faster downlink. 
Initially telephone modems were used for the uplink, 
but this approach has several disadvantages such as slow 
data rates, not always on service and telephone lines may 
not be an option in remote areas. An alternative solution is 
for the subscriber equipment to transmit the uplink signal 
back to the satellite over the same antenna used for signal 
reception (hence the name DVB-RCS Return Channel 
Satellite). 
Throughout the bibliography [3], [9] security in 
DVB-RCS networks adopts a traditional view such as 
confidentiality and integrity of data and source authentica-
tion. In addition due the particular nature of satellite com-
munications there is an effort to secure the physical layer 
against Jamming, Detection/Interception, Traffic Analysis, 
Denial of Service and Replay attacks [3]. However privacy 
concerns such as location based privacy have received little 
attention and relied only on scrambling the forward and 
return link to prevent unwanted leakage of information 
([9] p.23). However for reasons that will be explained in 
the following paragraphs the exact location of the RCST’s 
(Return Channel via Satellite Terminal) is still known to 
the Network Operator. 
Usually, location based privacy enhancing techniques 
can be based on purpose built technologies, or by using 
false location data without affecting the operation of the 
underlying system information. Representative technolo-
gies involve MIXes [2], [11] or data perturbation. Grutester 
et al. [10] employed data cloaking by reducing spatial ac-
curacy in order to offer location based privacy. A similar 
concept was followed by Kido et al. [12] where false 
(“dummy”) location data is submitted by a user in order to 
conceal their location. 
Location information in the context of satellite com-
munications is vital for synchronization purposes in the 
Return Link of an RCST in a DVB-RCS network. Its loca-
tion (latitude, longitude and altitude) must be known to the 
operator of the network, assuming accuracy of the location 
of no more than a few kilometers [8]. Concealing location 
is a challenging exercise since in practice this means that 
an RCST cannot synchronize with the Hub station and 
provide connectivity to the end user unless it is configured 
with the coordinates of the installation location. It is thus 
the fundamental part of the design philosophy of a DVB-
RCS network that force the user to provide (and disclose) 
the RCST physical location with an accuracy of a few 
kilometers. For certain users and sectors (such as govern-
ment, law enforcement and military for example) this can 
be viewed as an unacceptable leakage of information secu-
rity event. 
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The main research goal of this work is to find out if 
the fundamental design principles of the DVB-RCS stan-
dard would allow a user to bypass location accuracy 
restrictions and employ data cloaking in order to enhance 
location based privacy. The methodology adopted to meet 
this goal involves a theoretical analysis of the DVB-RCS 
standard, development of a privacy enhancing extension to 
the standard and finally validation via a proof of concept 
“attack” on a real DVB-RCS system. In addition we 
present the results along with the methodologies and tools 
used. 
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we 
outline the main aspects of DVB-RCS specification for the 
benefit of the reader. In section 3 we develop the privacy 
preserving approach and investigate its integration within 
the DVB-RCS specification. Section 4 describes the proof 
of concept used for empirically validating the proposed 
approach, and finally section 5 contains the conclusions. 
2. The Privacy Lacking DVB-RCS 
Specification 
For the benefit of the reader in the next paragraphs we 
present an introduction to the design principles that the 
DVB-RCS standard is based on. Radio communications 
can generally be classified as unidirectional or bi-direc-
tional. In unidirectional communications such as broad-
casting (e.g. TV services) a station solely uses its assigned 
frequency bandwidth. In bidirectional radio communica-
tions (full duplex) stations monopolize their allocated 
resources during transmission time. Unfortunately satellite 
frequency capacity and power is both limited and expen-
sive. With the exception of dedicated use such as TV 
program delivery, transponder bandwidth has to be shared 
among many users. Therefore almost all satellite communi-
cations systems employ techniques to permit Multiple 
Access (MA) to the satellites limited resources. Classical 
methods for MA such as TDMA (Time Division Multiple 
Access) and FDMA (Frequency Division Multiple Access) 
are used in current DVB-RCS networks. 
 
Fig. 1. Typical Satellite Communications System. 
In general principle all satellite communications in-
volve at least three stations, two placed on the earth surface 
and a repeater station on the satellite (Fig. 1): 
 Space segment: Satellite and the transmission paths.   
 Ground segment: Stations communicate via satellite, 
and  
 Interconnection to the terrestrial networks: e.g. 
connection to a terrestrial ISP.  
Communication between any two Terminals depends 
on the network topology. Satellite, being usually a “pas-
sive” relay (mirror in the sky) does not enforce a specific 
network topology. Although Mesh networks provide ad-
vantages such as half the latency in Terminal-to-Terminal 
communications their traffic handling requirements 
increase with the number of installed Terminals. For this 
reason, in large installations, all DVB-RCS are configured 
as stars (Fig. 2) where all Terminals communicate via base 
stations called Hubs. The terms “Hub” and “Gateway” can 
be used interchangeably to designate the major station 
(having full control over its Terminals) in a satellite com-
munications system, carrying terrestrial network services to 
and from Terminals. In the case of VSAT (Very Small 
Aperture Terminal) particularly, the term “Hub” is used to 
identify the central station of a star network configuration 
(Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2. Typical Star Satellite network. Physical (a) and 
Logical (b) architecture is depicted. 
DVB-RCS systems support bi-directional communi-
cations by means of: 
 Forward channel: Transmission from Hub station to 
many terminals.   
 Return channels: Transmission from the Terminals 
to the Hub station. 
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Fig. 3. Bi-directional communications via Forward and Return 
channels. (adapted from [14]). 
Forward channel provides the “point-to-multipoint” 
service. It has a single carrier which may utilize the full 
bandwidth of a transponder and it is identical to a DVB-S 
broadcast channel. Forward link resources sharing by the 
RCST’s, is accomplished through the use of different time 
slots in the TDM carrier. 
Return channel capacity, of one or more satellite 
transponders, is shared among Terminals by transmitting in 
bursts, using MF-TDMA (Multiple Frequency-TDMA). 
This means that there is a number of return channel fre-
quencies, each divided into time slots. These time slots 
then can be assigned to Terminals permitting simultaneous 
transmission to the Hub Station (Fig. 3). A Common clock 
for all terminals is provided via timing information (NCR 
Network Clock Reference) embedded in the Forward Link. 
In a satellite network, the Hub and the satellite are 
located at fixed points on the earth’s surface and on the 
geostationary orbit respectively, keeping the uplink and 
downlink transmission times between the Hub and the 
satellite very nearly fixed. Terminals on the other hand can 
be spread throughout the satellites footprint, having differ-
ent signal transit times between them and the satellite. This 
variation is unimportant to the forward link due to its 
broadcast nature. 
However on the uplink the Terminals transmit in 
bursts that share a common return channel. These bursts 
are spaced from each other in time. Those small variations 
in Terminal-to-Satellite transit times can disrupt transmis-
sion since, as illustrated in Fig. 4, a burst from one Termi-
nal may collide with a neighboring burst sent by a Termi-
nal having a longer signal transit time to the satellite. 
Differences in Terminal-to-Satellite transmission 
times might be compensated for by using time slots suffi-
ciently longer than the bursts emitted by the terminals, so 
that before and after a burst there is a guard time (Fig. 5) 
sufficiently long to prevent collisions or power leakage 
from switch-off transients with the bursts in neighboring 
slots in the TDMA frame. 
 
Fig. 4. Terminals located at different places in satellite 
footprint. Uplink transmission times to and from them 
vary. 
“The one-way delay time between a Hub and a Ter-
minal varies from 250 to 290 milliseconds, depending on 
the geographical location of the Terminal with respect to 
the Hub. So the time differential, ΔT, might be as large as 
40 milliseconds. Consequently, the round-trip time differ-
ential might be as large as 80 milliseconds. Thus, the total 
guard time associated with a slot would have to be at least 
80 milliseconds. This is excessive, particularly as the guard 
time does not carry information and wastes satellite re-
sources” ([14] p.37). Minimizing guard in most TDMA 
systems involves various means of timing adjustments to 
compensate for these Terminal-to-Satellite path differ-
ences. DVB-RCS has two built-in methods of pre-compen-
sating the burst transmission time of each Terminal [14]: 
 Each terminal is configured with its local GPS co-
ordinates and therefore can calculate its own burst 
transmission time. 
 The Hub monitors the arrival time of bursts and can 
send timing correction information to Terminals if 
need be. 
 
Fig. 5. Time slot in a DVB-RCS system (adapted from [8]). 
3. A Location Privacy Preserving 
DVB-RCS Approach 
From the basic operational theory of a DVB-RCS 
network, presented in section 2, it is obvious that the 
necessity of providing the exact location to the RCST and 
consequently to the network operator, is only needed for 
the calculation of the range (distance) between the specific 
RCST and the satellite. This range is then used by the 
RCST to synchronize its transmission bursts (calculate 
appropriate delays) in a TDMA frame of the Return 
Channel. We can also see that the calculation of this range 
can be within some tolerances which can be “absorbed” by 
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the system through the mechanism of the guard time 
between consequent bursts of the RCST’s. 
So let us now assume that we have an RCST R, 
whose real geographical position lies in the footprint of 
satellite S, and has (true) LLA (Latitude, Longitude, Alti-
tude) coordinates (LatR, LongR, AltR). The geosynchro-
nous satellite S locates at longitude LongS. The range be-
tween satellite S and RCST R (DistanceR-S) is given by the 
following equation: 
 ),,,( LongSAltRLongRLatRFDistance SR    (1) 
where F is the function that provides the range (distance) 
in meters between the RCST and the satellite.  
Now let us consider some other coordinates LatR’, 
LongR’, AltR’ different than the true ones that satisfy the 
following equation: 
 ),',','( LongSAltRLongRLatRFDistance SR  .  (2) 
If (2) is satisfied then we can provide the RCST with 
the new “fake” LatR’, LongR’, AltR’ coordinates and the 
system would continue to operate without any loss of 
availability or QoS reduction in general, having effectively 
hidden the real location of our RCST from the network 
operator. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the locations on Earth 
(assuming a spherical earth) which are equidistant from the 
specific satellite S, lie on the intersection of two spheres. 
The first sphere is the earth (Sph01). The second sphere 
(Sph02) has center the position of the satellite S and radius 
the distance (DistanceR-S) between the satellite and the 
RCST. This concept is depicted in Fig. 6. 
 
Fig. 6. Intersection of two spheres where Sph01 is the Earth 
and Sph02 has center the position of Satellite S and  
Radius=DistanceR-S.. 
We also have to note that not all points that belong to 
the intersection of the above spheres can be used to hide 
our true location. This is due to satellite footprint which 
may not cover the total of the intersection. Although we 
could use from a physical standpoint any location on the 
intersection, this would raise suspicion on the network 
operator because an RCST would be located in a place 
where there is no satellite coverage. 
So we can only use the points that belong both to the 
satellite footprint AND the intersection of two spheres in 
order to effectively hide our RCST without raising any 
kind of suspicion. 
3.1 Incorporating the Privacy Preserving 
Method into the DVB-RCS Procedures 
In the DVB-RCS standard for an RCST to be able to 
join the network it has to get into various states following 
specific procedures. Initially the RCST is at the Receive 
Sync state, which is reached following the Initial syn-
chronization procedure (described later). Then the entry 
of an RCST into the system is achieved through the 
following four phases [5]: 
 Logon procedure: the RCST requests initial access 
to the network and gets initial logon information from 
the network.   
 Acquisition coarse synchronization procedure (op-
tional): the RCST improves its physical synchroniza-
tion (frequency, time, and power adjustments).  
 Fine synchronization procedure: the RCST com-
pletes its physical synchronization. 
 Synchronization maintenance procedure: the 
RCST maintains its physical synchronization during 
the entire session.  
Corresponding to the procedures, the RCST can be in 
one of the following states [5]: 
 Hold: the RCST is in hold mode. In this state the 
RCST is instructed by the NCC (Network Control 
Center) to cease transmission until it is told differ-
ently.   
 Inactive Off/Stand-by: the RCST is not powered or 
on a stand-by mode or has lost synchronization.  
 Receive sync: the RCST has acquired the forward 
link. 
 Ready for coarse sync: the RCST has been detected 
by the NCC, and may initiate a coarse synchroniza-
tion procedure. 
 Ready for fine sync: the RCST has been detected by 
the NCC, and may initiate a fine synchronization 
procedure. 
 Fine sync: the RCST is synchronized and can send 
traffic. 
Especially important is the initial synchronization 
procedure which is followed by the RCST in order to enter 
the Receive sync state. This procedure is executed immedi-
ately after the power-up of the RCST and is described 
below [5]: 
 The RCST receives all necessary control information 
related to the operation of the DVB-RCS network 
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through the forward link. This includes NCR (Net-
work Clock Reference) synchronization, through 
which the RCST initiates its internal clock. 
 The RCST then calculates the satellite ranges for both 
forward and return links using the satellite ephemeris 
data contained within the Satellite Position Table 
(SPT, acquired through the Forward link signaling) 
plus a knowledge of its own location (latitude, longi-
tude and height above sea level). It uses then these 
ranges to calculate the corresponding satellite to 
RCST and RCST to satellite propagation delays. In 
case the NCC does not transmit an SPT the nominal 
satellite position can be used, which can be found in 
the NIT (Network Information Table acquired also 
through the Forward link signaling). 
 The RCST continues to receive the NCR throughout 
the session. In the event that NCR synchronization is 
lost, the RCST ceases transmission and re-starts the 
initial synchronization procedure. Similarly, any fail-
ure of the RCST during one of the later procedures 
takes the RCST back to the initial synchronization 
procedure. 
 The RCST receives the burst time plan transmitted by 
the NCC at regular intervals. The BTP is contained in 
the Forward link Signaling, and is made of the Super-
frame, Frame and Timeslot Composition Tables. 
Coarse and Fine synchronization procedures which 
are optional are used only in cases where timing errors are 
above “coarse sync thresholds” and “fine sync thresholds”. 
Initial burst time errors can be low when the satellite 
and terminal position are known. Provided that the 
NCC/gateway receivers can cope with these errors, which 
are small for a satellite maintained in a tight “box”, there is 
no requirement for the RCST to perform the ranging proc-
ess of the coarse synchronization procedure. Therefore if 
we use as “fake” coordinates those that produce the same 
DistanceR-S as the true coordinates (measured with a GPS 
device) of the RCST the whole synchronization-logon 
procedure would be carried out successfully in both cases. 
The DVB-RCS standard states that “an RCS system 
can be designed assuming accuracy of the location (lati-
tude, longitude and altitude) of the RCST of no more than 
a few kilometers” [8]. Let us be conservative enough in our 
calculations, by using an accuracy of 2 km. The area At of 
a circle with center in the true location of the RCST and 
a radius of 2 km is: 
 56.12222   rAt km2. (3) 
This means that the NCC assumes that the location of 
the RCST lies in this specific area At (by reading the RCST 
coordinates). 
If we modify (2) relaxing the equality restriction we 
have 
 1000mDistanceD SR  1 ,   
 1000mDistanceD SR  2 ,  (4) 
 2),',','(1 DLongSaltRLongRLatRFD  .   
Equation (4) transforms the intersection of the two 
spheres of Fig. 6, from a line into a ribbon with an area of 
AI. We then keep the part of the ribbon that lies within the 
footprint of the satellite, having an area of AIF (AIF < AI). 
Then we can define a metric for the improvement of loca-





ALP  .  (5) 
In the next section we present a proof of concept of 
the above theory, tested in a real DVB-RCS system, along 
with experimental results. 
4. Proof of Concept and Experimental 
Results 
In order to test the theoretical findings presented in 
the previous section, we developed a practical method, 
tested in a real DVB-RCS network. Also we had to take 
into account the following restrictions: 
 A normal user usually does not have access to the 
ephemeris data of the satellite (necessary for obtain-
ing the best accuracy in the range calculations). 
 Guard time between time slots is network dependent 
and it is not announced to the users of the DVB-RCS 
service. 
 A normal user does not have easy access to expensive 
equipment, such as DVB-RCS analyzers. 
 Earth is not an ideal sphere. 
It was our intention to keep the validation approach as 
simple as possible, the equipment to be the absolute mini-
mum and the necessary data to be freely available, in an 
effort to prevent unnecessary leakage of user information 
through other channels (e.g. through the purchase of non-
free high accuracy Earth surface elevation data). For the 
specific practical method that was carried out during this 
work, we used: 
 One SatNet 4100 satellite modem (DVB-RCS) from 
Advantech Wireless, Canada. 
 Subscription to the DVB-RCS network of Hellenic 
Aerospace Industry (1024down/256up kbps). 
 PC with a core2duo at 3.33GHz cpu, 4GB ram and 
1TB hard drive. The operating system was Fedora 
Linux. The necessary software was developed in 
C/C++ using development tools provided by the 
distribution. 
 The Digital Elevation Model, for the footprint of the 
satellite used by our DVB-RCS provider, was 
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acquired from the Advanced Spaceborne Thermal 
Emission and Reflection Radiometer (ASTER) 
instrument of the Terra satellite (freely available 
covering 99% of the globe) [1]. 
 The footprint of the satellite (Fig. 7) was acquired 
from LyngSat Maps [13]. 
 The DVB-RCS network operator uses the Hellas Sat 
2 satellite located at 39oE. 
For the purpose of our tests, we used a DVB-RCS 
terminal (SatNet 4100) [15] located at the premises of 
Democritus University of Thrace (DUTH). The RCST was 
initially fully functional, obviously configured with the 
correct (acquired through the use of a common GPS 
device) coordinates: 
 oDUTHLat 142445.41 ,   
 oDUTHLong 890225.24 ,  (6) 
 m 79DUTHAlt .   
 
Fig. 7. Footprint of Hellas Sat 2 satellite (adapted from 
LyngSat Maps [13]). 
A Digital Elevation Model (DEM) – also sometimes 
called a Digital Terrain Model – generally refers to a repre-
sentation of the Earth’s surface (or a subset of this), ex-
cluding features as vegetation, building, bridges, etc. DEM 
data usually come in the form of raster images holding 
surface elevation data along georeferencing (e.g. latitude, 
longitude) information. There are various sources for ob-
taining free DEM data, one of them being the ASTER 
instrument of the Terra Satellite covering the globe at 
a 30meter resolution (1 arcsecond) [1]. Terrain Elevation 
data from ASTER can be downloaded from their site, in 
the form of GeoTIFF [16] files where embedded in the 
header are geographic information and the value of each 
pixel represents its Altitude. Combining these pieces of 
information we can compute the latitude, longitude and 
altitude information (in the World Geodetic System 84 
(WGS84) reference frame [4], for every pixel on the raster. 
Based on Fig. 7 (satellite footprint) and for the needs 
of our experiment, we have downloaded from ASTER 
website the Digital Elevation Model (in GeoTIFF format) 
for the region which is depicted in Fig. 8. Using these files 
we calculated for every point i (having Lati, Longi, Alti 
coordinates) on the terrain the distance (Distancei-S) from 
Hellas Sat 2 satellite. Hellas Sat 2 is located (latitude, 
longitude and altitude coordinates) at: 
 2.786,35,39,0  SoSoS AltELongLat km.  (7) 
 
Fig. 8. Digital Elevation Model for the area of interest (lies 
inside Hellas Sat 2 footprint). Color represents the 
altitude above sea level. 
The distance between the Hellas Sat 2 satellite and the 
location of our RCST in DUTH was calculated and found 
to be: 
 749,37SDUTHDistance  km. (8) 
For every point i of the Digital Elevation Model of 
Fig. 8 we calculated the distance Distancei-S. The points 
that their distance from Hellas Sat 2 satisfies the following 
equation (9): 
 1000mDistanceD SDUTH  1 ,   
 1000mDistanceD SDUTH  2 ,  (9) 
 21 DDistanceD Si      
can be considered that are equidistant to Hellas Sat 2 
 SDUTHSi DistanceDistance     (10) 
and that their latitude, longitude and altitude (Lati, Longi, 
Alti) coordinates can be used on the RCST instead of the 
true ones (LatDUTH, LongDUTH, AltDUTH). The geographical 
location of the points that satisfy (9) along with the real 
location of the RCST are depicted in Fig. 9 (thin grey line 
and red X mark respectively). 
 
Fig. 9. The gray line denotes the geographic location of the 
points of the terrain that satisfy (9). The true location 
of the RCST is denoted with a red X. 
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Fig. 10. Coordinates of Locations P1-P12 were used instead of 
the real ones (DUTH) and the RCST continued to 
synchronize to the Hub station. 
The next step was to configure our RCST through its 
web interface with the latitude, longitude and altitude 
(Lati, Longi, Alti) coordinates of various points that lie in 
the “equidistant” grey zone (Fig. 9), while our RCST was 
still located in DUTH premises. For every set of coordi-
nates that we provided, we rebooted the RCST and 
watched if it could still synchronize and connect with the 
Hub station. This procedure takes about 4 minutes and 
obviously we could not perform this test for all the points 
that lie in this “equidistant” zone (for the 30m grid of 
Fig. 9 the grey “equidistant” zone included 3,096,855 
points). The above procedure was repeated for a large 
number of points that were spread throughout this “equi-
distant” zone and the RCST synchronized and connected to 
the hub as expected. A sample of those points is depicted 
in Fig. 10 and their coordinates are presented in Tab. 1. 
 
Point Latitude [°] Longitude [°] Altitude [m] RCST Sync. 
(YES/NO) 
P1 39.2181061 19.5055362 0 YES 
P2 39.4347330 20.0060191 70 YES 
P3 39.6999143 20.6409601 312 YES 
P4 39.9016014 21.1377080 1505 YES 
P5 40.1331681 21.7689140 820 YES 
P6 40.3834096 22.4934937 149 YES 
P7 40.6934102 23.4048208 33 YES 
P8 40.9810011 24.3198828 50 YES 
P9 41.2237726 25.1415711 467 YES 
P10 41.4553393 26.0043438 398 YES 
P11 41.6981109 26.9978397 138 YES 
P12 41.9296776 28.0286851 69 YES 
Tab. 1. Coordinates of Locations P1-P12 and synchronization 
results. 
In the previous section we developed a metric (5) for 
the level of improvement on location privacy for an RCST. 
For the RCST located at DUTH, the area that is covered by 
the “equidistant” zone (excluding sea areas) of Fig. 9 was: 
 1650IFA  km2 (11) 















.  (12) 
The same test procedure was repeated successfully for 
an RCST physically located at: 
 oTESTLat 962939.372  ,   
 oTESTLong 690662.232  ,  (13) 
 282 TESTAlt  m.  
The “equidistant” zone for this location along with 
the successfully tested “fake” locations, are presented in 
Fig. 11a, 11b. 
 
Fig. 11. Physical location of TEST2 RCST (red X mark) and 
respective “equidistant” zone (grey line) (a). P1-P9 
coordinates were used instead of the true ones 
(TEST2) and the RCST continued to synchronize to 
the Hub station. 
5. Conclusions and Areas of Future 
Research. 
In this work we presented that by exploiting the 
physics that govern the DVB-RCS return link synchroni-
zation we can significantly improve the location privacy 
level of an RCST. This paper also presented a methodol-
ogy, using the least possible equipment, free software and 
freely distributed terrain elevation data for the calculation 
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of the geographic area where the user can effectively 
“hide” his/her terminal. The theoretical findings and the 
utilized methodology were tested on a real system with 
successful results. Although the location privacy was 
greatly improved, the restrictions we set on “equidistancy” 
(1 km) were really conservative. It is our intent to explore, 
in a following work, the limits of this methodology in order 
to maximize the area that a user can effectively “hide” 
his/her terminal. 
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